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Abstract—An anonymous credential system allows the user
to convince a veriﬁer of the possession of a certiﬁcate issued
by the issuing authority anonymously. One of the applications
is the privacy-enhancing electronic ID (eID). A previously
proposed anonymous credential system achieves the constant
complexity for the number of user’s attributes. However, due
to the use of RSA-based cryptography, it still suffers from a
high cost computation. Recently, we proposed an anonymous
credential system with the constant complexity using a pairing-
based accumulator, where more efﬁcient ECC (Elliptic Curve
Cryptography) can be used instead of the RSA. In this paper, we
present an implementation of the anonymous credential system
in the application to the eID. We show the practicality of the
system from experimental results that the processing times are
constantly less than a second.
Index Terms—Authentications, privacy, anonymous creden-
tials, electronic ID, pairings
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Backgrounds
Electronic identiﬁcation have been widely applied to ac-
cess to buildings, use of facilities, Web services, etc. Cur-
rently, electronic identity (eID) such as eID card is often
used for the identiﬁcation. The eID is issued by a trusted
organization such as the government, company, or university,
and used for services provided by the organization. On the
other hand, such a trusted ID is very attractive for secondary
use in commercial services. The eID includes attributes of
the user such as name, address, gender, occupation, date
of birth. In commercial cases, instead of the identiﬁcation,
the attribute-based authentication is desired. For example, a
service provider can refuse the access from kids, by checking
the age in the eID.
One of serious issues in the existing eID systems is user’s
privacy. In the systems, the eID reveals the user’s identity.
Thus, the service provider can collect the use history of
each user. Furthermore, part of attributes are a high privacy-
sensitive, and only the selected attributes should be disclosed.
Anonymous credential systems [1], [2], [3], [4] are one of
the solutions.
Anonymous credential systems allow an issuer to issue a
certiﬁcate to a user. Each certiﬁcate is a proof of membership,
qualiﬁcation or privilege, and it contains user’s attributes.
The user can anonymously convince a veriﬁer of the posses-
sion of the certiﬁcate, where the selected attributes can be
disclosed without revealing any other information about the
user’s privacy. The user can prove complex relations on the
attributes using AND and OR relations. AND relation is used
when proving the possession of all of the multiple attributes.
For example, the user can prove that he is a student, he has
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a valid student card, and this card has not yet expired, when
entering the faculty building. OR relation represents the proof
for possession of one of multiple attributes. For example, he
can prove that he is either a staff or a teacher when using a
copy machine in the ofﬁce.
B. Related Works
In [1], Camenisch and Lysyanskaya ﬁrstly proposed an
anonymous credential system based on RSA. Unfortunately,
it suffers from a linear complexity in the number of user’s
attributes in proving AND and OR relations. Hence, this
system is not suitable for small devices such as smart
cards. In [3], Camenisch and Gro extended the system
to solve the drawback, where the attributes are encoded
into prime numbers. Then, the AND and OR relations are
proven with the constant complexity w.r.t. the number of
attributes using zero-knowledge proofs of integer relations
on prime numbers. However, due to the use of RSA-based
cryptography, it still suffers from a high cost computation.
An implementation of eID on a standard Java card using
the systems of [1], [3] is shown in [5].
C. Our Contributions
In [4], we proposed a pairing-based anonymous credential
system with the constant complexity. The use of pairings
allows us to apply ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) in-
stead of RSA. Thus, due to the shorter key size, we expect
light computations. In this paper, to show the practicality
of the proposed system, we present the implementation and
evaluate it from experiments. For the implementation, we
suppose an eID application over Web services for mobile
environments. In the prototype system, the computation time
of the prover (user) and the veriﬁer (server) are relatively
constant of only 640 ms and 153 ms when proving the
AND relation. They are only 630 ms and 152 ms for the
OR relation. Unfortunately, as the compensation, the size
of the public key depends on the number of attributes. It
varies from 601 kB to 6 MB when the number of attributes
increases from 1,500 to 15,000. In the current mobile PC
environments, the data size is sufﬁciently practical, since the
public key is not changed after it is distributed in the user
registration.
II. IMPLEMENTED ANONYMOUS CREDENTIAL SYSTEM
A. Model
We show the model of the anonymous credential sys-
tem [4] which is derived from [2]. As well as [3], this model
employs two types of attributes for representation. One type
is a small ﬁnite-set attribute such as the gender or theoccupation. Another type is a string attribute such as the full-
name or the address. The example of those attributes used in
the eID is depicted in TABLE I. The anonymous credential
system consists of three protocols: KeyGen, ObtainCert,
and ProveCert.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF STRING AND SMALL FINITE-SET ATTRIBUTES.
String Small Finite-set Example Values
1) full-name 8) gender male,female
2) address 9) day of birth 1–31
3) phone number 10) month of birth 1–12
4) identity number 11) year of birth 1930–2005
5) issuance date 12) marital status single,marriage
6) expiration date 13) nationality 193 recognized states
7) email address 14) hometown 200 allocated cities
15) city living 200 allocated cities
16) residence status citizen,immigrant,...
17) religion moslem,christian,...
18) blood type A,B,O,AB
19) occupation student,teacher,...
20) academic degree B.S.,M.S,Ph.D.,...
21) major science,economic,...
22) year of graduated 1970–2005
23) workplace 200 allocated cities
24) main language 100 allocated lang.
25) 2nd language 100 allocated lang.
26) topic of interest music,sport,...
27) favorite color red,green,blue,...
28) favorite music pop,rock,jazz,...
29) favorite sport baseball,tennis,...
 KeyGen: This is a probabilistic key generation algo-
rithm for the issuer, on the input security parameter
1L and the maximum numbers of string and ﬁnite-set
attributes n,ℓ, outputs the issuer’s public key ipk and
the issuer’s secret key isk.
 ObtainCert: This is an interactive protocol between
a probabilistic algorithm User of user with IDi and
a probabilistic algorithm Issuer. The common input
of this protocol are ipk and (SAi, FAi) that are sets
of string attributes and ﬁnite-set attributes of the user,
respectively. In addition, the input for Issuer is isk.
The output of User is the certiﬁcate cert[i] ensuring
the attributes (SAi, FAi).
 ProveCert: This is an interactive protocol between the
user and the veriﬁer. The common inputs are ipk, and
(TSA, TFA) are subsets of string attributes and ﬁnite-
set attributes respectively, and user’s secret inputs are
cert[i] and (SAi, FAi).
(1) By using the string attributes, it is proven that
a part of attributes TSA  SAi is all certiﬁed
by cert[i].
(2) For the ﬁnite-set attributes, we have two op-
tions:
(a) the AND relation proves that all of the
attribute sets TFA are certiﬁed by cert[i],
or
(b) the OR relation proves that one of the
attribute sets TFA is certiﬁed by cert[i].
The security requirements of the anonymous credential
system are as follows:
 Unforgeability: Only the user with the certiﬁcate certi-
fying the proved relation is accepted by the veriﬁer in
ProveCert protocol.
 Anonymity: Any veriﬁers cannot identify the user from
ProveCert protocol.
 Unlinkability: Any veriﬁers cannot determine whether
any pair of ProveCert protocols were conducted by the
same user or not.
The unlinkability is a stronger anonymity. In linkable
anonymous setting, the veriﬁer can collect the use history
of an anonymous user, since the veriﬁer can determine the
sameness of the prover. Then, the history may de-anonymize
the prover by relating the dates or frequency. Also, if one
transaction is de-anonymized by some other method, all the
transactions of the prover are de-anonymized. Therefore, the
unlinkability is needed.
B. Outline of Cryptographic Construction
Generally, anonymous credential system can be con-
structed as follows. The certiﬁcate is a cryptographic digital
signature, where multiple attribute values are signed. The
signature is denoted as Sign(a1,a2,...,ak) that is signing
function on attribute values a1,a2,...,ak. By using a zero-
knowledge proof technique, the user can prove only the
knowledge that he owns Sign(a1,a2,...,ak), where parts
of the attributes can be secret.
In [6], using a bilinear map called pairings instead of RSA
cryptography, a short certiﬁcate with the zero-knowledge
proof is proposed. However, in the pairing-based certiﬁcate,
each attribute value is expressed as an exponent on a base
assigned to the attribute type. Hence, proving the knowledge
of the certiﬁcate needs the cost depending on the number of
attribute types.
In the implemented system, a pairing-based accumulator
[2] is used for expressing the ﬁnite-set attributes (for the
string type, it still use the exponent). The accumulator, given
multiple inputs fgi1,...,giℓg  fg1,...,gkg, outputs a
single value acc = f(gi1,...,giℓ). In addition, we can prove
the validity of the accumulation with the constant cost. In
our anonymous credential system, each attribute value ai is
assigned to gi. Then, the accumulated value acc is signed by
an extended signature scheme for the certiﬁcate. Thus, by the
zero-knowledge proofs that gi is accumulated to acc and that
acc is signed, the user can prove that an attribute value ai is
certiﬁed with the constant complexity. In proving AND rela-
tion of ai1 ^^aiℓ′, we require the zero-knowledge proof
that every gij is accumulated into acc. The bilinear property
of the pairing allows us to unify the pairing computations
of the accumulators into a single pairing computation. Thus,
we can achieve the constant complexity. In OR relation of
ai1 _  _ aiℓ′, we can use another accumulator to prove
some aij s.t. aij 2 fai1, ,aiℓ′g. The zero-knowledge
proof needs only the constant cost, and thus the total cost is
also constant.
The demerit of using the accumulator is that we need the
number of input values of the accumulator is the number of
all attribute values. Since the input values have to be included
in the public key ipk, the size of ipk increases in proportion
to the number of attribute values.
C. Utilized Pairing Library
To implement the pairing-based construction, we need
the fast library computing the pairings together with theunderlying ECC operations. We utilize the library based on
“Cross-twisted χ-based Ate (Xt-Xate) pairing” [7] with 254-
bit group order and the embedding degree is 12. The security
level is equivalent to the 3000-bit RSA. The library is based
on the GMP library and implemented by C language due to
the pursuit of the fastness.
Fig. 1. System model.
III. DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS
The system model of the eID application is shown in
Fig. 1. At ﬁrst, the issuer publishes its public key ipk. Then,
the user registers himself along with particular attributes
(SAi, FAi) to the issuer for certiﬁcation by using ObtainCert
protocol via a secure channel (¬®). Based on the issued
certiﬁcate, he requests a service to the Service Provider (SP)
(¯). Then, the SP speciﬁes attributes that the SP wants to
know (°). This speciﬁcation forms AND or OR relation,
depending on the SP’s requirement. Then, the user generates
a proof for the possession of certiﬁcate w.r.t. the speciﬁed
attribute(s) and shows it to the SP (veriﬁer) anonymously
by using ProveCert protocol (±). If only if the veriﬁcation
of user’s proof is valid, the SP grants the user to access a
requested service. In this scenario, we can consider that the
number of ﬁnite-set attribute values is at least 1,500, due to
the involvement of the nationality, city, language, and other
categories as shown in TABLE I.
We design our protocols: user registration and authentica-
tion as follows.
A. User Registration
Fig. 2 shows the user registration protocol. This protocol
comprises the following two steps. In advance, the user
has to fetch the issuer public key ipk, for example by
downloading it from the ofﬁcial web-site of issuer. We
assume that there is an existing access control application
(e.g., based on username and password) to permit the user
to use a communication channel (which is out of scope
of this paper). Then, he can use such channel to perform
ObtainCert protocol together with the issuer.
(1) Registration of user’s attributes.
The user requests the registration. He sends his
attributes for certiﬁcation (¬®).
(2) Issuing the certiﬁcate.
Fig. 2. User registration protocol.
(a) The issuer computes the accumulator, certiﬁes
it into certiﬁcate cert and sends cert to the
user (®°).
(b) The user checks the validity of cert to ensure
whether cert was sent by the legitimate issuer
or not. If it is valid, he embeds his secret keys
into the cert and outputs the user certiﬁcate
cert[i] (±²).
B. Authentication
The authentication mechanism is performed by using a
ProveCert protocol. Fig. 3 shows the authentication process
to allow the user to access the service provided by an
SP through wireless networks. This protocol comprises the
following two steps. In this protocol, the user can prove
his possession of particular attributes into two ways, AND
relation proving and OR relation proving.
Fig. 3. Authentication protocol.
(1) Generation and transmission of a proof for posses-
sion of certiﬁcate.
(a) The user requests a service to the SP. Then,
the SP provides him a set of speciﬁed at-
tributes. Depending on the SP’s requirement,
there are two options, multiple selection and
one selection of a set of speciﬁed attributes
(¬­).
(b) By using cert[i] and the selected attribute(s),
the user generates the proof for the possession
of such attribute(s). This proof means thatsuch selected attribute(s) is(are) included in
the certiﬁcate. Then, he shows the proof to
the SP (®¯).
(2) Veriﬁcation of a proof for possession of certiﬁcate.
(a) The SP veriﬁes the proof. If it is valid, the
SP grants the user to access the service (resp.
reject the service) (°±).
(b) The veriﬁcation result is displayed in the web
browser of the user which indicates either
accept or reject to access the service (²).
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We basically implemented our system using Java through
the Java GUI and Java applet at the user and Java servlet at
the Servide Provider (SP) and the issuer, since the Java applet
and Java servlet communications are useful to implement
the web-based applications. The communication between the
user and the servers (i.e., the issuer and SP) is over http
connections. The cryptographic processes in the anonymous
credential system are implemented by C language as the
middle-ware, since we need the fast computations as well
as the underlying pairing library. As the interface between C
and Java, we use Java Native Interface (JNI).
Pre-computation process. To reduce the computation
time in the authentication protocol, we pre-compute the
ﬁxed value components (e.g., the pairing calculations of
ﬁxed values of public key components). This pre-computed
data are used to generate or verify the proof, where the
computation times of generating and verifying the proof are
reduced to about 51% and 30%, respectively.
Reply attack protection. An attacker may duplicate some
valid transcript of the authentication to use for another
session. To protect this, we use a random nonce. The nonce is
computed by the hash function from the user’s deﬁned mes-
sage (this can be any messages including random numbers)
and timestamps.
Fig. 4. Implementation of user registration protocol.
The implementation of user registration protocol is de-
picted from Fig. 4. In this implementation, there are three
steps:
1) Step 1: By using the ipk, he executes the registration
process of the middle-ware through JNI. Then, he
sends the issuer his attributes (¬®).
2) Step 2: User’s attributes, ipk, and issuer secret key
isk are the input parameters for generating user mem-
bership certiﬁcate cert provided by the middle-ware
(¯°).
3) Step 3: Upon receiving cert, the user embeds his secret
to the cert and outputs the user certiﬁcate cert[i].
Then, he executes a pre-computation process to provide
a pre-computed data to be used later in generating the
proof (±).
Fig. 5. Implementation of authentication protocol.
The implementation of authentication protocol is depicted
from Fig. 5. In this implementation, there are two main
processes; user’s proof generation and veriﬁcation. At ﬁrst,
the SP needs to download the ipk from the issuer and
executes the pre-computation process from the middle-ware
to obtain pre-computed data.
1) User’s proof generation: The selected attribute(s), ipk,
cert[i], and user’s pre-computed data are used as the
input parameters for generating the proof. This is
performed by using the proving function in the middle-
ware. The function provides AND and OR relations
proving. The proof is based on the random nonce
generated from the hash function. The Java applet is
embedded into local web page to interact with Java
servlet at the SP’s web server (¬¯).
2) Veriﬁcation: At the SP side, the received proof, ipk,
and the SP’s pre-computed data are used as the input
parameters to verify the proof. This is done by execut-
ing the veriﬁcation function in the middle-ware. This
function also provides AND and OR relations. The
correctness of the nonce is also checked. The output of
this function is valid or invalid (resp. accept or reject)
(°±).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Test Bed
We have implemented the user registration protocol and
authentication protocol (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) in our proposedFig. 6. Experimental environment.
system to conﬁrm the practicality. Fig. 6 shows the exper-
imental environment of our proposed system. The devices
and software speciﬁcations used in this test bed are shown
in TABLE II.
TABLE II
SPECIFICATION OF DEVICES IN EXPERIMENTS.
Intel Core2Duo 3GHz, 4GB RAM
Veriﬁer/ Ubuntu Linux 9.10 kernel-2.6.31
Issuing Authority gcc-4.4.1, OpenSSL-0.9.8g, GMP-4.3.1
Java-1.6.0 18, apache-tomcat-5.5.28
Intel Atom 1.33GHz, 1GB RAM
Prover/ Windows XP Home Edition SP3
Joining-User Atheros AR928X Wireless Adapter
MinGW-5.1.6, OpenSSL-0.9.8g,
GMP-4.3.1, Java-1.6.0 19
B. Evaluation
Fig. 7 shows the total processing times of the authentica-
tion protocol in the AND relation and the user registration
protocol. The total time of the authentication protocol in-
cludes the proving time, veriﬁcation time, and the communi-
cation time during the process. This time varies from 917 ms
to 927 ms, where the number of attributes are from 1,500
to 15,000. It is from 904 ms to 912 ms for the OR relation.
The communication time is measured from sending the
proof until receiving the response of authentication process
from the veriﬁer with excluding the veriﬁcation time. The
communication time is about 120 ms. The time of the user
registration protocol varies from 809 ms to 828 ms, as the
number of attributes increases from 1,500 to 15,000. This
small variation is derived from accumulator computation
and fetching the public key. In addition, our system has
an advantage that the sizes of the proofs for AND and OR
relation proving are constant at about 1324 Byte and 1424
Byte, respectively. The size of issued certiﬁcate is constant
at about 272 Byte.
Fig. 8 shows the processing times of the proving and
veriﬁcation for the AND relation and the size of the public
key as the number of attributes varies. The times of the
proving and veriﬁcation vary from 642 ms to 649 ms and
from 153 ms to 154 ms, respectively. This small variation is
derived from the process of fetching the public key. However,
these times are constant by ignoring such process. On the
other hand, the times in proving the OR relation are 635 ms
and 152 ms. Unfortunately, this system has a drawback that
 700
 750
 800
 850
 900
 950
 1000
 2000  4000  6000  8000  10000  12000  14000
T
i
m
e
s
 
[
m
s
]
Number of attributes
Authentication process
User Registration process
Fig. 7. Total processing times.
the size of public key varies from 601 kB to 6 MB. However,
in the current mobile PC environments, the data size is
sufﬁciently practical, since the public key is not changed
after it is distributed in the user registration.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented an implementation of a pairing-based
accumulator for the anonymous credential system with ef-
ﬁcient proofs of AND and OR relations of attributes to
the application of eID. In the prototype system, the user
registration and authentication protocols are processed within
a second, and thus we conclude that the system is sufﬁcient
practical. To achieve more efﬁcient proofs and reduce the
size of the public key are our future works.
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